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Introduction 
Many studies have explored the existence of 
nominal wage differentials between regions. The 
irrefutable conclusion is that wage differentials 
exist and that they persist over time.'  Such differ- 
entials are difficult to explain within a neoclassi- 
cal framework in which regions and factors are 
identical and all factors are free to move in 
response to interregional factor price differentials. 
In this case, one must resort to explanations 
based on institutional barriers and other impedi- 
ments to free mobility. 
The key to understanding how 
wage differentials (and other factor price differen- 
tials) can persist in the presence of free mobility is 
to recognize that some factors are inherently immo- 
bile. For instance, each region has geographic 
and climatic characteristics that are unique to the 
area. Even for those areas that share common fea- 
tures, the quality and quantity of the site-specific 
characteristics may differ. Therefore, firms or 
households will be willing to pay or accept dif- 
ferent levels of wages depending upon the value 
they place on these attributes. 
For instance, firms may find that 
proximity to improved harbors reduces shipping 
costs and thus reduces production costs. In this 
case, firms can offer higher wages and still remain 
competitive with firms in lower-wage regions be- 
cause of the cost advantage of the harbor. Since 
......................................... 
Bellante (1979). Johnson (1983), and Eberls and Stone (1986) are  1  examples of numerous studes that have exam~ned  ~nlerreg~mal 
wage different~als. 
land next to the harbor is limited, the influx of 
firms attracted by the harbor will increase the de- 
mand for both labor and land. Wages and rents 
will be bid up until the cost advantage of the 
harbor is completely offset by the increase in fac- 
tor prices. Thus, wages and land rents vary across 
regions according to the value firms place on the 
site-specific attributes in each region and their 
ability to substitute between factors of production. 
A similar story can be told about 
households. Households may value the same 
harbor that firms find attractive, except for differ- 
ent reasons. The harbor that reduced shipping 
costs for firms may be attractive to households as 
a place to enjoy water sports. Consequently, as 
more households move into the area to take 
advantage of the harbor, the supply of labor 
increases and the demand for land increases. 
Thus, wages fall and land rents rise until individ- 
uals are no longer willing to accept proximity to 
the harbor as compensation for lower wages and 
higher land rents. 
The resultant wage differential 
between an area with a harbor and one without 
depends upon the relative magnitudes of the 
demand and supply responses to site characteris- 
tics. If wages are observed to be higher in the 
harbor area than in the area without a harbor, 
then the demand response (the firm's response) 
dominates the wage determination process. If 
wages are relatively lower in the harbor area, then 
the supply response (the household's response) 
dominates the process. In both cases, land rents 
will be higher because both households and 
firms value the harbor. Iand rents would be 
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lower in the harbor area than in an otherwise 
comparable area if  the harbor was detrimental to 
both parties. Consequently, by observing relative 
wages and rents, it is possible to identify whether 
a region's bundle of site characteristics has a 
greater net effect on firm location decisions or 
household location decisions. 
The purpose of this paper is to 
identify metropolitan areas according to the 
extent to which they are dominated by supply 
and demand responses to their net bundle of 
site-specific characteristics. To do this, we esti- 
mate hedonic wage and rent equations for a 
sample of metropolitan areas. From these esti- 
mates, we derive quality-adjusted wage and rent 
differentials for each area. The metropolitan areas 
are then classified into four groups based on the 
relative values of an area's wage and rent differen- 
tial vis-avis the national average. The metropoli- 
tan areas are identified as high amenity (low 
wage, high rent), low amenity (high wage, low 
rent), high productivity (high wage, high rent), 
and low productivity (low wage, low rent). Classi- 
fication of this sort provides information about 
the relative attractiveness to firms and households 
of the total bundle of attributes indigenous to 
each metropolitan area. 
I.  A Model of  Household and Firm Equilibrium 
In this section, we first present a model, based on 
the work of Roback (1982), of the effects of inter- 
area differences in amenities and productivity on 
wages and rents. We then show how this model 
can be used to determine the relative importance 
of amenity and productivity differences as sources 
of factor price differentials across cities. 
Several simplifying assumptions 
are made in modeling the relationship between 
interarea differences in amenities and productiv- 
ity and interarea differences in wages and rents. 
Workers are assumed to be identical in tastes and 
skills and completely mobile across cities. Sim- 
ilarly, capital is assumed to be completely mobile 
and production technologies are assumed to be 
identical across firms.2 
.......................................... 
If  people have d~fferenl  peferences  the value of  certaln areas wtll  2  be understated In our  approach,  whrh uses a comparison of  cost 
of  llvrng dtfferences as an  rndlcatron of  the value indlvlduals  place on  ctt 
ies (see Roback [1982])  The  second set of  assurnptlons refers to the 
rnob~l~ty  of  households and flrrns  We assume that rnlgat~on  IS  costless 
and that  glven the relallve wages  rents, and slte characterrsttcs across 
cttles, both f~rrns  and households have chosen locattons such that they 
could not be made better off by relocattng  If rnovrng 1s  not costless  we 
may have b~ased  est~mates  of  the attract~veness  of  areas  lnd~v~duals  or 
flrms may  percelve that they would be better off by movmng, but lf 11 IS 
costly to do so  they w~ll  move only ~f  the extra benef~ts  of  movlng out 
we~gh  the costs of  movrng  We may then be  over  or  underest~mat~ng 
the attract~veness  of an area slnce we Ignore the costs of  moving 
In this model, cities are character- 
ized as bundles of attributes, which can affect the 
utility of households and the costs of  production 
for firms. Individuals in these cities consume and 
produce a composite consumption good. The 
price of the good is determined by international 
markets and for convenience is normalized to 
one. Each worker supplies a single unit of labor 
independently of the wage rate. We assume that 
individuals work in the city in which they live, 
and we treat differences in leisure resulting from 
differences in intracity commuting as a site char- 
acteristic.3 Equilibrium in this mtdel is character- 
ized by equal utility for identical workers and 
equal unit costs for firms across all regions. 
Workers choose the Itx-ation that 
maximizes their utility, subject to an income con 
straint. Utility depends upon consumption of the 
composite commodity (X),  residential land (LC), 
and amenities (s).  Equivalently, the problem can 
be stated in terms of an indirect utility function, 
I.: which is a function of wages ( uj),  rents ( r), 
and amenities (s). Equilibrium for workers 
requires that utility is the same at all Itxations, or 
(1)  V( u:r;s)  = V'! 
The equilibrium relationship between wages,  17 
rents, and amenities for households can be 
determined by totally differentiating the indirect 
utility function. In log form, this relationship can 
be stated as: 
(2)  alnv  dlnw+  alnv  dlnr + alnv =  0 
alnu~  k  alnr  ds  as 
Using Roy's identity, the marginal 
valuation of amenities in a city evaluated relative 
to the marginal utility of income is 
(3)  z=  k,  dlnr/ds - dlnuqds, 
U' 
where P, is the monetized value of the amenities, 
and kl is the portion of consumer income spent 
on land. Equation 3 states that individuals pay for 
amenities through reductions in real income in 
the form of  higher land rents (which reduce 
income by kl times the increase in rents) and 
lower wage income. 
Firms are assumed to employ Itx-dl 
residents and to use land to produce the compos- 
ite commodity, X,  according to a constant- 
returns-to-scale production technology. Under 
these assumptions, equilibrium for firms requires 
that unit costs are equal in all ltxations and equal 
to the price of X, assumed to be 1, 
(4)  C( u:r;s) =  1. 
.......................................... 
3 
Robacks model ignores lntrac~ty  commutrng  Hoehn  et al  (1986) 
have po~nted  out  that thls leads to Incorrect estrmates of the 
value of  other slte characterlstrcs  S~nce  we are not Interested In der~v 
Ing values for  speclflc character~st~cs,  but slmply the net Impact of  these 
charactenst~cs,  our model 1s  not subject to thrs crltlclsm  We  therefore 
slmply assume that tntraclty commutrng 1s  another slte characlerlstlc 
that reduces le~sure  tlrne and therefore 1s  a dlsamen~ty  for  workers 
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The relationship between wages, 
rents, and site characteristics (s),  which are con- 
sistent with equilibrium for firms, can be 
expressed in log form as: 
alnc  dlnul+ alnC  dlnr +  alnC =  0.  (5) ----  - 
alnu~  ds  alnr  ds  as 
The marginal value to firms of different Itx-ations 
is 
(6)  Cs =  - O ,.(  dlnr/ds)  - el,,(  dlnuilds), 
where - C, is the price that firms are willing to pay 
to locate in one city rather than another, and 
0,. and O,,, are the cost shares of land and labor, 
respectively. 
If the site characteristics of a city 
provide a net productivity advantage to firms, 
then firins will pay for this advantage in terms of 
higher wages and rents and - C,  will be positive. 
Wages and rents in each city are determined by 
the interaction of the Itration decisions of the 
households and firms. 
Combinations of  lnuj and lnr for 
which the unit costs of firms are equal are depict- 
ed in figure lb. The value of site characteristics to 
firms is fured along each quasi-isocost curve, and 
the curves shift up (down) as the site characteris- 
tics of a city increase (decrease) the productivity 
of firms. The slope of the quasi-isocost curve is 
equal to the elasticity of substitution between 
land and labor, which from equation 6 is - O,,  10,. 
According to figure lb,  site characteristics in city 
S,  enhance productivity more than site character- 
istics in city s,. 
Each city is characterized by a 
bundle of amenities and site characteristics that 
are sscx-iated with a specific pair of isocost and 
iso-utility curves in figures la and lb.  The inter- 
section of any tcvo curves for each city then 
determines relative wages and rents. In figure 2, 
equilibrium wages and rents in city S, will be 
uj,  and r, . Using city 5, as a reference point 
Equilibrium Conditions for Households and Firms 
1 A 
rent 
I  -  I  - 
wage  wage 
SOURCE: Authors. 
1 B 
FIGURE  1 
rent 
Classitication of Cities as Amenity 
or Productivity Cities 
The model described above is illustrated in figure 
1. The upward sloping curves in figure la [labeled 
v(.)]  , show combinations of lnul and lnr for 
which utility is equal. The slope of these curves is 
the trade-off that households are willing to make 
between wages and rents for any given level of 
amenities. From equation 3, this trade-off is equal 
to the inverse of the budget share of land, k ;  l. 
Along each curve, the value of amenities is fured 
and the curves shift up (down) as the amenities 
of  one city are valued more (less) than the amen- 
ities of other cities. The value of amenities in the 
city labeled S,  is greater than the value of ameni- 
ties in the city labeled S,, since individuals are 
willing to pay higher rents at evely wage rate. 
i 
(which could be thought of as the average city), 
we can see how intercity differences in amenities 
and productivity will be reflected in differences 
in wages and rents. 
Consider a city S,  that differs from 
Sl only in that the site characteristics of city S2 
provide a greater productivity advantage to firms 
than the site characteristics of city S,. In figure 2, 
this is illustrated by C( S,  ) lying above C( S, ). 
Assuming there is no difference in amenities 
between the two cities, we can see that equilibrium 
requires that wages and rents in city S,  be high 
relative to city S,  . These higher wages and rents re- 
flect the amount firms are willing to pay to locate 
in city S,  rather than S, and, therefore, the pro- 
ductivity value of  S,  relative to the average city. 
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Productivity Differences and Equilibrium Wages and Rents 
rent t 
SOURCE: Authors 
FIGURE  2 
Consider another city, S,, that 
differs from S, only in that households find it to 
be more amenable. This relationship is illustrated 
in figure 3, where city S,  is represented by  V(S3), 
which is to the left of  V(S, ). If no productivity 
differences exist, [that is, C( S,)= C(S,)], the dif- 
ference in the households' valuation of amenities 
across cities leads to lower wages and higher 
rents in the more amenable city, S3. 
Amenity Differences and Equilibrium Wages and Rents 
rent I 
1  - 
U'3  U'1  wage 
SOURCE: Authors. 
FIGURE  3 
Within this simple framework in 
which cities differ in either amenities or produc- 
tivity, but not both, we can determine whether 
factor price differences reflect intercity differences 
in amenities or productivity by examining the 
pattern of wages and rents across cities. If wage 
and rent differences primarily reflect amenity dif- 
ferences across cities, we would see a negative 
relationship between wages and rents. If  they 
reflect productivity differences, the relationship 
would be positive. 
Within the same framework, we 
can also classify individual cities on the basis of 
whether their wages and rents differ from the 
average because of above-average amenities, 
below-average amenities, above-average produc- 
tivity, or below-average productivity. These classi- 
fications are summarized in table 1 and figure 4. 
Of course, cities may differ in 
characteristics that affect both household utility 
and production costs. The problem of  classifying 
cities by the relative magnitudes of these two 
effects becomes one of identifying the portion of 
the wage and rent differentials due to a shift in 
each curve. This can be done by identifying the 
combinations of lnul and lnr that would result 
from equal shifts of both curves and determining 
how wages and rents in each city fall relative to 
these shifts. The combinations of lnr and 
[nu!  that would result from equal shifts of both 
curves will form two lines with slopes that 
depend upon k ;  1  and - O,,,  /Or. If  k ;  I  (the 
slope of the  curve) is equal to O,,. /Or  (the 
negative of the slope of the C.$ curve), the com- 
binations of  lnw and lnr resulting from equal 
shifts of both curves would coincide with the x 
and y axis. 
Assuming for illustration that this is 
the case, for any city with above-average wages and 
rents, the shift of the C,  (productivity) curve 
must be greater than the shift of the  Vs  (amenity) 
curve. Therefore, any city with wage and rent com- 
binations in quadrant A in figure 4 is classified as 
a "high productivity" city, because the primary 
reason that this city's wages and rents differ from 
those of the average city is the above-average 
productivity it affords firms. This above-average 
productivity is reflected in the ability of firms in 
these cities to pay above-average wages and rents. 
Similarly, cities with below-average 
wages and rents (quadrant C in figure 4) are clas- 
sified as "low productivity" cities, since firms in 
these cities are compensated for the below- 
average productivity related to site characteristics 
with below-average factor costs. 
Above-average amenities in a city 
are associated with increases in rents and 
decreases in wages reflecting households' will- 
ingness to pay for the amenities. Quadrant D 
then identifies cities where the dominant factor 
determining relative wages and rents is high 
amenities. For cities in quadrant B, the dominant 
factor is their below-average amenity value. 
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Classification of Cities 
I 
*: High Productivity 
---- 
C.  Low Productivity  I B: Low Amenity 
I 
I 
-  uJ  wage 
SOURCE: Authors. 
FIGURE  4 
Classification of Cities 
Direction of Price Differential 
City CWication  Rent  Shi 
High productivity  High  High  C(S,)  curve up 
Low productivity  Low  Low  C(S,)  curve down 
High amenity  Low  High  V(S,)  curve up 
Low amenity  High  Low  V(Si)  curve down 
SOURCE: Authors 
TABLE  1 
Classification of  Cities and the Relative Productivity 
and Amenity Effects 
These labels may be misleading in 
that what we are referring to as "high productiv- 
ity" cities are not necessarily more or less anrac- 
tive to households than the "high amenity" cities. 
A city like the one represented by point A in fig- 
ure 5 is relatively attractive to both households 
and firms. This relationship can be seen by the 
positions of  C(S,)  and ~(5,)  relative to the 
average city. The effect that dominates, however, 
is the productivity effect, since the shift of the 
C,  curve is greater than the shift of the  I/,  cunre. 
Another city like the one repre- 
sented by point B may be less attractive to both 
firms and households than city A (again reflected 
in the relative positions of the amenity and pro- 
ductivity curves). However, the dominant trait of 
city B is its amenities, which are above average. 
11.  Estimation 
The analysis is based on wage and rent data for a 
sample of recent movers drawn from the Public 
Use Microdata Sample of the 1980 Census of Popu- 
lations. This subsample includes individuals who 
lived and worked in the same Standard Metropoli- 
tan Statistical Area  (SMSA) in 1980 and who 
changed addresses between 1975 and 1980. This 
subsample of movers was chosen because housing 
prices of recently acquired or rented dwellings 
more accurately reflect current land market 
conditions. 
The rent equation includes both 
owner-occupied and rental units for which posi- 
tive values of unit or gross rent are reported. The 
dependent variable in the rent equation is gross 
monthly housing expenditures. For homeowners, 
the monthly housing expenditure is based on the 
value of the dwelling using 7.85 percent as the 
discount rate.4 The monthly housing expenditure 
is the sum of this imputed rent and monthly util- 
ity charges. For renters, the monthly expenditure 
is gross rent (contract rent plus utilities). 
Individuals included in the wage 
sample had to meet the following criteria. Indi- 
viduals had to be between the ages of 25 and 55; 
work more than 25 hours per week; not be self- 
employed; and have positive wage and salary 
income. The dependent variable in the wage 
equation is average weekly earnings, which is 
calculated by dividing annual wage and salary 
income by the number of weeks worked. 
SOURCE: Authors.  ......................................... 
The  d~scount  rate IS  from a study of  the user cost of  cap~tal  by 
FIGURE  5  Pe~ser  and Smith (1985). 
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Quality-Adjusted Wages 
A hedonic approach is used to estimate wage dif- 
ferentials across SMSAs. This approach uses 
regression analysis to determine the value the 
market places on different worker characteristics. 
An individual's wage is then predicted based on 
the value of  his or her characteristics. The first 
step in constructing the wage indexes is to spec- 
ify estimable equations that reflect appropriate 
individual characteristics of workers that could 
Estimates of Wage Equation 
Variables 
Intercept 
Sex (Female = 1) 






Usual hours worked 
per week 
Head of household 
Veteran 
Sex x Race 
Sex x (Marital status) 
Sex x Experience 
Sex x (Experience squared) 
Marital status 
Union member 




















R-square  .34 
No. observations  22,313 
Dependent variable: 
log (weekly earnings)  5.50 
Note: Estimates derived from Public Use Microdata Sample. T-statistics in 
parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors. 
affect wages. Our approach follows the human 
capital specification of individual wages set forth 
by Hanoch (  1967) and Mincer (  1974). Thus, we 
specifi individual wages (expressed in loga- 
rithms) as a function of education level (entered 
as a quadratic), potential experience (age minus 
years of education minus six, also entered as a 
quadratic), a binary variable indicating part-time 
employment status (less than 35 hours per 
week), and 42 binary occupation variables (with 
one omitted as a constant). Binary variables are 
also entered to account for gender, race, marital 
status, union affiliation, and whether or not an 
individual is a ~eteran.~  In addition, the gender 
variable is interacted with other characteristics in 
order to control for malejfemale differences in 
the rate of return to these attributes. 
The estimated coefficients of the 
wage equation are presented in table 2, except for 
the occupation variables, which are omitted for 
brevity. The estimated coefficients are as expected. 
Education and experience are valued positively in 
the labor market, while part-time, female, and 
nonwhite workers receive lower wages than their 
otherwise identical counterparts. We also find 
that individuals who are married, heads of  2 1 
households, and in highly unionized industries 
earn more than their counterparts. Females 
receive less return on experience than males. 
The predicted wage level for each 
worker in the sample is obtained by multiplying 
the estimated coefficients by each worker's char- 
acteristics. The predicted wage can be interpreted 
as the compensation a worker could expect to 
receive, given his or her characteristics, regardless 
of geographic location. Subtracting the predicted 
wage from the actual wage nets out the portion 
of the actual wage that is related to the individual 
worker's characteristics. The skill-adjusted metro- 
politan wage differentials are then obtained by 
averaging the wage residuals (actual minus pre- 
dicted wage) for all workers in a particular metro- 
politan area. Average wage differentials are calcu- 
lated for each of 38 cities. The 38 metropolitan 
areas are chosen by including only those SMSAs 
for which 100 or more individuals in the sample 
were recorded as movers between 1975 and 1980. 
The quality-adjusted wage differentials are dis- 
played in table 4. 
Rent Equation 
The method used to calculate quality-adjusted 
rent differentials is similar to the one used to cal- 
culate quality-adjusted wage differentials. The log 
of monthly housing expenditures is regressed 
.......................................... 
15 
The  measure of  unlonlzatlon In the wage equatlon is the ~ndustry 
unlonlzatlon rate taken from Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985)  TABLE  2 
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Estimates of  Rent Equation 
Variables  Mean  Coefficient 
Intercept  -  9.93 (248.36) 
Dwelling rented (=I)  .53  ,084 (1.35) 
Central city (=I)  .14  -.05 (-3.29) 
x rental  .021 (1.70) 
Number of floors  1.10  .I22 (5.43) 
x rental  -.056 (-2.62) 
Attached dwelling (=I)  .06  .06 (2.41) 
x rental  .027 (1.17) 
Year dwelling built  3.65  -.06 (-17.98) 
x rental  -.018 (-4.94) 
Number of rooms  7.07  .ll (22.80) 
x rental  -.032 (-5.64) 
Number of bedrooms  4.25  .lo (9.96) 
x rental  ,011 (1.03) 
Well water  (=I)  .14  .06 (3.70) 
x rental  -.027 (-,831 
Central air 
conditioning (=I)  .52  .12  (9.13) 
x rental  ,038 (2.82) 
Central heating (=  1)  .91  .12  (6.35) 
x rental  -.058 (-4.14) 
Dwelling other than 
condominium (=I)  .96  -.046 (1.62) 
Number of units 
at address  2.92  -.003 (-,651 
x rental  ,007 (1.41) 
Number of bathrooms  2.72  ,179 (32.03) 
x rental  -.056 (-6.73) 
City sewer 
connection (=I)  .87  ,053 (4.27) 
x rental  .004 (.18) 
Lot size less than 
one acre (=I)  .92  -.I30 (8.72) 
x rental  .I85 (8.07) 
Elevator (= 1  )  .04  ,065 (2.45) 
No. observations  16,017 
Dependent variable: 
log (house value)  11.07 
Note: Estimates derived from Public Use Microdata Sample. T-statistics in 
parentheses. The entry "x rental" indicates that the rental dummy variable 
has been interacted with the variable listed immediately above it. 
SOURCE: Authors. 
against housing attributes. These characteristics 
include the number of rooms, number of bed- 
rooms, number of bathrooms, and separate binary 
variables indicating location of the dwelling in 
the central city, and whether or not the dwelling 
is a single structure, has central air conditioning 
and/or heating, is connected to a city sewer sys- 
tem, and has well water. The year the dwelling 
was built is entered to proxy the vintage. Dwell- 
ing characteristics are interacted with rental status 
in order to account for differences in the valua- 
tion of these attributes between rented and 
owner-occupied dwellings. 
Coefficient estimates are reported 
in table 3. The results are as expected. larger, 
newer dwellings with central air and heating and 
that are located outside the central city have 
higher market value than otherwise identical 
homes. In general, attributes of rentals are valued 
less than otherwise identical owner-occupied 
dwellings. The predicted rent is calculated by 
multiplying the estimated coefficients by the 
housing characteristics of each household. The 
quality-adjusted rent differentials presented in 
table 4 are the differences between the actual and 
predicted house values. 
By  including a number of  housing 
characteristics in the rent equation, the difference 
between actual and predicted house values can 
be interpreted to reflect primarily land values in 
specific geographical locations. Thus, quality- 
adjusted rent differentials relative to the national 
average reflect differences in city land values, 
which are due primarily to the capitalized effects 
of differences in site characteristics. 
Land Shares 
In addition to the quality-adjusted wage and rent 
differentials, our classification of cities requires 
estimates of the share of household income 
spent on land (k,  ) and the ratio of the income 
shares of land and labor in production (e,/O,.). 
These values are not readily available for each 
specific metropolitan area. Thus, we use national 
estimates and assume that the portion of house- 
hold income spent on land and the ratio of labor 
income to land income in production are con- 
stant across metropolitan areas and equal to the 
national average. 
The budget share of land is calcu- 
lated by multiplying the fraction of income spent 
on housing (27.0 percent in our sample) by the 
ratio of land value to the total value of the house 
(estimated to be 19.6 percent).6 From these esti- 
mates, land's share of household income (k,  ) is 
TABLE  3  The ratio of land value to total house value was estimated by 
Roback us~ng  FHA hous~ng  data. Unfortunately, the census data 
used In th~s  study cannot be used to make a new estimate.  I 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Best available copy1987  QUARTER  3 
5.3 percent. The ratio (8,/8,, ) is calculated by sub- 
tracting our estimate of k,  from the ratio of the to- 
tal income to land (6.4  percent of national 
income) relative to total labor income (73 percent 
of national income).'  The ratio of these income 
shares is 8.8  and the estimate of O,/B,,  is 3.5. 
111.  Classification of  Cities 
As  discussed in section I, we can determine 
whether wage and rent differentials reflect varia- 
tions in productivity or amenities across SMSAs  by 
examining the pattern of wage and rent differen- 
tials across SMSAs.  If intercity wage and rent dif- 
ferentials primarily reflect amenity differences, we 
should obsenle a negative relationship between 
wages and rents. If they primarily reflect produc- 




ted wages and 
rents for the SMSAs  in our sample are presented 
in figure 6. It appears from figure 6 that there is a 
slight positive relationship between wages and 
rents in our sample. Using the same amenity and 
productivity quadrants found in figure 4,  more 
SMSAs  lie in the "prcxiuctivity" quadrants than in 
the "amenity" quadrants. This is confirmed by a 
positive correlation coefficient of 0.46. The rela- 
tively small value of the coefficient suggests that 
the relationship is not the same across all SMSAs. 
We now proceed to determine 
whether deviations from the average wages and 
rents for individual SMSAs primarily reflect a) 
above-average amenities, b) below-average amen 
ities, c)  above-average productivity, or d)  below- 
average productivity. 
In order to determine the combi- 
nations of wages and rents that fall into each of 
these categories, we must first determine the 
wage and rent combinations that form the boun- 
daries for these categories. These boundaries are 
determined by the combinations of wages and 
rents that would result from equal shifts of the 
V,  and C,  curves relative to the average SMSk 
Using the estimates of land shares discussed 
above, we find that for all practical purposes 
these boundaries coincide with the x and y axis 
in figure 6.8 
A listing of cities in each category 
is presented in table 5. Most of the SMSAs fall 
2  3 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas Included in Sample 
0.3075 
I 
San ~i&o,  CA 





I  San Francisco, CA 
I  Anaheim, CA 
I  ~os  Angeles, CA  San Jose, CA 
*I  Boston, MA  Nassau,NY 
I  Newark, NJ 
I 
Portland, OR 




Riverside, CA  Houston, TX  ------------------  -  *-Detroit. MI 1 
Sacramento, CA  I  Philadelphia, PA 
Phoenix, AZ  I  -  .,"I.:--..-  .an 
Cleveland, OH 
Salt Lake City, UT 
New Orleans. LA 
I  -  UalLIIIIuIC, IVIU 
Pittsburgh, PA 
I  st. buis,  MO  Cincinnati, OH 
I*  Dallas, TX 
I 
Tampa, FL  ~olumbus,'~~ 
I  Atlanta, GA 
Kansas City, MO I 
-0.2~2~  1  San Antonio, TX 
I  Indianapolis, IN 






FIGURE  6 
7  .......................................... 
The estlmate of labor compensation 1s  taken from the nat~onal 
income account data reported In Table B-23 of  the Economlc 
Report  of the  Pres~dent  (1987)  Unfortunately, the nat~onal  Income 
accounts do not Include land Income as a separate category of Income 
Our  estlmate of land's share of lncome IS taken from Mills and Hamllton 
(1  984) 
8 
The  exact  boundar~es  are two lines that pass through the orlgln, 
one wlth a slope of  003,  the other wlth slope 333  We classlfled 
cltles based on  these boundaries, but the class~f~cat~ons  do not change if 
one uses the x and y axls as reference polnts 
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Quality-Adjusted Rent and Wage Differentialsa 
Quality-Adjusted 
Metropolitan Area  Rent  wage 
Anaheim, CA  .281  ,078 
Atlanta, GA  -.I45  .014 
Baltimore, MD  -.075  .03  1 
Boston, MA  .220  -.001 
Chicago, IL  .lo4  .081 
Cincinnati, OH  -.082  ,064 
Cleveland, OH  -.053  .lo8 
Columbus, OH  -.I26  -.074 
Dallas, TX  -.lo3  .001 
Denver, CO  .036  -.013 
Detroit, MI  .013  .I49 
Ft. Iauderdale, FL  .039  -.029 
Houston, TX  .023  .I42 
Indianapolis, IN  -.  172  .04  1 
Kansas City, MO  -.I55  -.037 
Los Angeles, CA  .261  .049 
Miami, FL  ,076  -.I12 
Milwaukee, WI  .I00  -.002 
Minneapolis, MN  ,073  .065 
Nassau-Suffolk, NY  .240  .077 
New Orleans, IA  -.I10  -.079 
2 4  New York, NY  .I45  .036 
Newark, NJ  ,195  ,045 
Philadelphia, PA  -.013  .017 
Phoenix, AZ  -.029  -.047 
Pittsburgh, PA  -.079  .047 
Portland, OR  .059  -.027 
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA  .0  16  -.008 
Sacramento, CA  -.014  -.047 
St. Louis, MO  .085  .019 
Salt Lake City, 'UT  -.W9  -.081 
San Antonio, TX  -.203  -.lo5 
San Diego, CA  .I48  -.014 
San Francisco, CA  308  .073 
San Jose, CA  ,269  .I25 
Seattle, WA  .048  .047 
Tampa, FL  -.I42  -.I19 
Washington, D.C.  .116  .lo3 
a  Quality adjusted differentials  are obtained by subtracting the predicted 
estlmate from the actual value The reference point for these estimates is 
the sample average. 
SOURCE: Authors 
TABLE  4 
within expected classifications. For instance, 
Miami, Denver, Portland, Ft. Iauderdale, and San 
Diego are classified as high-amenity cities, since 
these cities are characterized by below-average 
wages but above-average rents, both of which 
reduce the income of households. 
In cities like Baltimore, Cleveland, 
Pittsburgh, and Atlanta, wages and rents primarily 
reflect the below-average amenity value to 
households of these cities. Households in these 
cities receive compensation for this low amenity 
value in the form of above-average wages and 
below-average rents. 
SMAs  that can be characterized as 
"high prtductivity" include Chicago, Houston, 
Los Angeles, and San Jose, among others. For 
these cities, both wages and rents are above aver- 
age, suggesting that the firms in these cities are 
compensated for high factor costs by other loca- 
tional characteristics of these cities. SMSAs  like 
Tampa, New Orleans, and San Antonio can be 
characterized as "low productivity." Firms in 
these areas are compensated for the belowr- 
average productivity value of site characteristics in 
the form of lower wages and rents. 
Classifying SMSAs according to  the 
dominant effect of their site characteristics does 
not mean that a high-prtxluctivity city has no amen- 
ity value. It simply means the city is dominated by 
its productivity characteristics. Using equations 3 
and 6, we can develop relative rankings of cities 
within the productivity groups by amenities and 
within the amenity groups by productivity. The 
ordering of cities in table 5 reflects this sort of 
cross classification. For example, of the high- 
productivity cities, New York, Los Angeles, and 
Seattle are considered more amenable than Chi- 
cago, Houston, and Detroit. Of the high-amenity 
cities, Boston is more attractive to firms than 
Miami. 
The classifications of some cities 
are questionable, especially for cities near the 
boundaries. For some cities like Boston and Mil- 
waukee, rents are considerably higher than aver- 
age, but wages are so close as to be indistinguish- 
able from the average. As  a result, we cannot be 
confident in our classification of these cities as 
high productivity or high amenity, although we 
can be fairly confident that they are not low- 
amenity or low-productivity cities. Philadelphia 
and Riverside are examples of cities that are so 
close to the average in both wages and rents that 
their classifications may also be meaningless. 
IV. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have utilized the relationship 
between regional wage and rent differentials to 
identify cities by the net effect of their bundle of 
site characteristics on firms and households. We 
have found that, on average, firms respond more 
to site characteristics than households, as is 
revealed in the relatively large contribution of 
demand effects to determining regional wage dif- 
ferentials. Nevertheless, the amenity (or house- 
hold) component of the total regional differential 
is also significant. Thus, regional wage differen- 
tials result from the interplay of the forces of 
supply and demand and exist even though indi- 
viduals move freely in response to factor price 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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Classitication of Cities 
High Productivity 
New York, NY 
Newark, NJ 
Los Angeles, CA 
Seattle, WA 
San Francisco, CA 
Minneapolis, MN 
Anaheim, CA 
Nassau-Suffol  k, NY 
Chicago, IL 
Washington, D.C. 










Ft. Iauderdale, FL 
Miami, FL 
Low  Productivity 
Tampa, FL 
San Antonio, TX 
Salt lake City, UT 




Kansas City, MO 










NOTE:  Productivity cities are listed from the most amenable to the least. 
Amenity cities are listed from the most productive to the least. 
SOURCE:  Authors. 
TABLE  5 
differentials. Thus, so long as regions differ in the 
amount and quality of their site-specific character- 
istics, wage differentials will continue to exist. 
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